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REAFFIRMATION OF CONFESSIONS INADMISSIBLE UNDER
McNABB-MALLORY*
POLICE interrogation 1 of the criminal accused gives rise to serious problems
regarding the right of the accused to avoid self-incrimination. The ultimate
purpose of police interrogation is to compel confession. 2 The process contem-
plates a confrontation, in the absence of trial-type safeguards, between the in-
terrogator and the accused in which the representative of the state tries by
force or persuasion to overcome the accused's will to resist self-incrimination.8
*Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
1. Either to challenge or to defend the need to interrogate is beyond the scope of this
note; this practical requirement of the information-gathering process is assumed. For some of
the stronger defenses of police interrogation, see Address by David C. Acheson, United States
Attorney, District of Columbia, before the Citizen's Crime Commission of Metropolitan
Washington, Dec. 10, 1962; Wickersham, The Supreme Court and Federal Criminal
Procedure, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 21 (1958) ; Inbau, Law and Police Practice: Restrictions
in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 77 (1957) ; Coakley, Law
and Police Practice: Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 2, 7 (1957);
Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442
(1948) ; and Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee to Study Decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
12, pt. 1, at 32-44 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Hearings]. (Statement of Robert V.
Murray, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department.)
The need to interrogate is often recognized in judicial opinion. See, e.g., Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) :
[Q]uestioning is often indispensable to crime detection. Its compelling necessity has
been judicially recognized as its sufficient justification, even in, a society which, like
ours, stands strongly and constitutionally committed to the principle that persons
accused of crime cannot be made to convict themselves out of their own mouths....
But if it is once admitted that questioning of suspects is permissible, whatever
reasonable means are needed to make the questioning effective must also be conceded
to the police.
Id. at 571, 579.
Those who denigrate the need to interrogate or who would propose its abolition are
either non-existent or timid and unprolific.
2. INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 140 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as INBAU & REDm]. The authors do qualify this ultimate function:
A criminal interrogator should always remember that it is his function not only to
obtain a confession from a guilty subject, but also to obtain one which meets the
necessary legal requirements.
Ibid.
3. Justice Frankfurter, in. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), stated:
The attention of the trial judge should have been focused, for purposes of the Federal
Constitution, on, the question whether the behavior of the State's law enforcement




If the interrogator is able to compel a statement of guilt admissible in evidence,4
it is as if the accused has been compelled 5 to testify against himself in court,
in violation of his fifth amendment privilege.8 It might be argued that such
compulsion occurs whenever the accused's will to deny is overcome by the force
or persuasiveness of interrogation, however great or effective the resistance
which preceded the final confession. Such an argument seems to reveal as
"compulsive" the character of almost all confessions secured by interrogation.
But courts, reviewing admissibility under due process standards, have found
confessions to have been coerced only where interrogation was accompanied by
the promise of favor or the threat of force 8---where, at the time of confession
there was an unconscionable gap between the interrogator's power to elicit
response and the accused's ability to exercise his right to silence.0 Because it is
4. Tricks, gimmicks and other more or less effective, more or less legitimate interroga-
tive techniques are found in INBAU & REID; O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL IN-
VESTIGATION 104 (1956) (describing the time-honored "Mutt and Jeff" technique); DmN-
STEm, TEcHNIcs FOR THE CRIME INVESTIGATOR at 97-108 (1952) ; MULBAR, INTERROGATI0ON
(1951); and KmD, PoLIcE INTERROGATIoN (1940).
5. In New York cases the phrase "testimonial compulsion" is used to point up the
similarities between testimony at trial and response to police interrogation and to indicate
that identical evidentiary standards are applicable to both situations. See, e.g., People v.
Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104 (1962).
6. U.S. CorsT. amend. 5. In. 8 WIG=OEo, EVIDENCE § 2266, at 400-01 (McNaughton
rev. 1961) the author claims that it is "erroneous, both in history and in, practice" to confuse
the test of voluntariness for confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination. Cases
which "blend the two into one principle" are to be "expected," but criticized. See, e.g., Brain
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) ; and Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921). But in their opinions modern, judges have proved to be careless historians and
heedless of Professor Wigmore's caveat. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959) ; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). In Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d
241, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court came full circle:
[T]he rules of evidence pertaining to confessions in a federal trial have been for-
mulated on the background of... the Fifth Amendment, particularly its provision
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self....
These are the trends which lead treatise writers almost to capitulate. See 8 NVGMoRE,
EvIDE.cE § 2266, at 402 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 (1954) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) ; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199 (1960) ; Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924). See also McCo=cx,
EViDENcE § 117-18 (1954) ; 3 WGmORE, EvmENcE § 815-67 (3d ed. 1940).
8. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (Police Chief said, "'[T]here
would be 30 or 40 people there in- a few minutes that wanted to get him, " and that, if the
accused would tell the truth, the Police Chief probably could keep the mob from coming in.
Id. at 565 n.10); and Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (Interrogation room
literally filled with police officers). See generally 3 NVIGuoar, EVIDENCE §§ 825-40 (3d ed.
1940) ; INBAU & REm.
Trickery and other forms of deception are allowed so long as they do not "induce" a
"false" confession. IwBAu & Ram, at 187-89; 3 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 841 (3d ed. 1940);
But see People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
9. Physical torture is almost pass6. For some of its archaic manifestations, see McCon-
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founded upon this definition of coercion, the reaction of the courts has been
incomplete; courts have validated non-coerced confessions despite their char-
acter as "compelled" self-incrimination."0 Moreover, the sanction attendant to
a finding of coercion is likewise incomplete. Although the improperly obtained
confession itself is deemed inadmissible, evidence found with its aid 11 and
subsequent, "voluntary," reaffirming confessions 12 made in the absence of co-
ercion are admissible despite the illegality which taints their source. Under
traditional analysis,' 3 this material is admissible since it, as opposed to the co-
erced confession itself, is both probative and trustworthy. Thus, unlike current
interpretation of similar fourth amendment situations, this analysis fails to coll-
sider the violence coercion does to constitutional privileges as relevant to the
scope of the rule.14 There is a pragmatic edge to this response of the courts:
the confession produced by interrogation of a resisting accused provides infor-
mation too useful and too all-encompassing to expect interrogation to be wholly
forbidden or to expect its successes to be wholly discarded. Although these
existing processes may rest on shifting sand, this Note will assume the con-
tinued need for interrogation, the present incompleteless of exclusionary rules,
and the courts' limited definition of compulsion; within this context, this note
will examine the admissibility of reaffirmed confessions in an effort to develop
standards adequate both to protect the accused from the effects of coercion and
to inhibit over-reaching police conduct.
Because of a felt need to apprise the prospective criminal defendant of his
rights, codes of criminal procedure,' 5 including the Federal Rules, 0 common-
miCic, EVIDENCE § 109, at 227 (1954). For some modem methods considered too gross to
allow the admission of the confession, see, e.g., Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)
(after long interrogation accused's wife and sick child summoned and brought before ac-
cused) ; Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (confession by tired, drowsy accused) ; Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (accused's policeman, friend playing upon the sym-
pathies of defendant).
10. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958).
11. See Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (discussion of
Wright, J., concurring).
12. See MCCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 114 (1954).
13. See 3 WmomRE, EvIDENcE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
14. Compare Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) and Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), with 8 WImxoRE, EVIDENCE § 2260 (MeNaugh-
ton rev. 1961).
15. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 849 (1956) ; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 660 (1935)
N.Y. CODE C1IM. PROC. § 165 (1958). See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 584
n.26 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.), for an excellent summary of cases and statutes.
16. FED. R. Cm-r. P. 5, provides in pertinent part:
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER
(a) Appearance before the Commissioner.
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unteces.
sary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby
officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the
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ly provide that shortly after arrest the accused is to be taken to a preliminary
hearing where a judicial officer will inform him that "he is not required to
make a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against
him" ;17 after the hearing, he may have the opportunity to post bail. 8 In any
event, he will pass out of the exclusive control of the police.10 In the time span
between the arrest and the magistrate's warning, police interrogation is fraught
with dangers of coercion.20 Faced with the persistent interrogator, uninformed
of his rights, isolated from friends and overcome by the "sinister venue"21 of
the police station, the accused is most vulnerable, most likely to incriminate
himself. Until 1943 state and federal law, developed under the impetus of Su-
preme Court decision, failed to distinguish the admissibility of confessions ob-
tained during this period from confessions obtained during later, more pro-
United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a com-
missioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
(b) Statement by the Commissioner.
The commissioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him, of his
right to retain counsel and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He shall
also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any
statement mnade by him may be uscd against him. The commissioner shall allow the
defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the
defendant to bail as provided in these rules. (Emphasis supplied.)
Compare, Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, EDEnAL RuLES o0 CRM-
INAL PROCEDURE: PRaE. xAv DRar at 11 (1943). Restating "the present law," in view
of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the preliminary draft of the rules in-
cluded, as Rule 5(b), the following:
(b) ExcLusIoN OF STATEMENT SECURED IN VIOLATION OF RuL.
No statement made by a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent
of the government shall be admissible in evidence against him if the interrogation
occurs while the defendant is held in custody in violation of this rule.
The clause was eliminated in Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, FExnm.
RuL.Es OF CRmaNAL PRocEnuRE: SECOND PRELuM NARY DAr 10-11 (1944).
Compare, also, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, RULES OF CRmrMTAL PROCEDURE FOP THE UxNsrn STATEs DLsscr
CouRTs: PREL nNARY DRAFT OF PROPOsED AmM NimTS (1962), proposing to amend Rule
5(b) to include, "The commissioner shall inform the defendant ... of his right to request
the assignment of counsel. . .
17. Fa. R. Cnmi. P. 5(b).
18. FED. R. Camr. P. 5(b), 46.
19. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. 410 (1948) ; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) ; and Trilling v. United
States, 260 F2d 677, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (separate opinion of Bazelon, J.).
In his concurring opinion in Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
Judge Wright stated:
[I]llegal detention, [between arrest and preliminary hearing] is so potentially con-
ducive to coercion that any confession procured during that time will be conclusive-
ly presumed involuntary.
Id. at 249.
21. Chalmers v. H. M. Advocate, [1953] Just. Cas. 66, 79 (Scot. 1959).
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tected periods in the criminal process.2 2 The common due process standard of
voluntariness placed upon the defendant the burden of proving the promise of
favor or the threat of force which would render the confession involuntary
and, hence, inadmissible.23 This burden was aggravated, moreover, by the com-
plexity of the test for the presence of coercion, namely, the totality of circum-
stances in the individual case.24 And such an imprecise test meant that limi-
tations on interrogator responsibility were loosely defined, thereby making ex-
perimentation with judicial tolerance attractive to the police.25 Since interroga-
tion at police headquarters was generally secret,20 testimony as to investigative
techniques, physical or psychological coercion was limited to the accused and
his adversaries.27 Given the expectable assessment of the credibility of criminal
defendants as compared to policemen, the accused's difficulties in demonstrat-
ing the coerced character of his confession seemed virtually insurmountable in
the very situation where coercion was most likely to occur.
In McNabb v. United States 28 the Supreme Court adopted a per so approach
to the admissibility of pre-preliminary hearing confessions in the federal courts,
abandoning the demonstrably unworkable voluntariness test as a judicial meas-
ure of due process. 29 McNabb renders inadmissible the confession which is the
product of "unnecessary delay"30 in bringing the accused before a magistrate
for preliminary hearing. The Court was troubled by the previous evidentiary
burden on the accused and the frequency of "third degree" techniques before
preliminary hearing. The clear effect of the decision was to strip the preliminary
interrogation of much of its value to police ;81 consequently, the police would
22. For an illustration of the pre-1943 approach to the confession problem, see 3 WIG-
MoRE, EviDENcE §§ 815-67 (3d ed. 1940).
23. See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
24. The case law does not lend itself to classification. At most one finds only a very
general portrait of the type of accused who appeals to the sympathy of the court and a
type of interrogative circumstance where "coercion" is likely to be found. Compare Crooker
v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), with Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
25. See generally U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENro0lCE-
MENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAw ENFORCEMENT (1931).
26. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 231 (1940).
27. Admissions and confessions do not fall within the hearsay rule. 3 WGMOm , EWV-
DENCE § 816 (3d ed. 1940).
28. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
29. Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and
evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal
historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are summarized as "due proc-
ess of law".....
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
30. McNabb was decided before the adoption of FED. R. Cedm. P. 5(a), but the lan-
guage of federal statute then in effect requiring prompt presentation of persons arrested
for preliminary examination was identical. McNabb v. United States, .supra note 29.
31. The announcement of the departure of the federal courts from the "voluntarlness"
rule was not universally well received. See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcommiltee No. 2 of
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be less likely to delay the accused's appearance before a judicial officer where
a cautionary statement would issue.32 Thus the thrust of the rule was as much
against the actual or potential abuse of the police interrogative function as it
the House Committee on the Judiciary on, H.R. 3690 (the Hobbs Bill), 78th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 12, at 1-10 (1943) [hereinafter cited as 1943 Hearings] (statement of Edward
J. Kelly, Superintendent of Police, District of Columbia) ; Inbau, The Confession Dilenina
in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rxv. 442 (1948).
Nor has resistance to the curtailment of police interrogation subsided. See, e.g., Dis-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA COsIlSSIONERS' COMM. ON POLICE ARRsSTs FOR INVE TiGATIoi, RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1962) [hereinafter cited as HoRsEY REPoR]. Following
the recommendation of the committee, the D.C. Commissioners banned arrests for investi-
gation, effective March 15, 1963. Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1963, p. 1. But see H.R.
1929, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (To permit an officer or member of the fetropolitan Police
force of the District of Columbia to detain, and question persons suspected of committing
crimes, and to require bond in the case of certain material witnesses.)
The crime rate in Washington, D.C. is extraordinary and the subject of great public
concern. Consequently, every major decision of the courts is thoroughly reported and
criticized. See, Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1962, sec. A, p. 31, coL 1; Washington Post,
Oct. 8, 1962, p. 14, col. 1. See also, The Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 1963, p. 20,
col. 5. A special Ford Foundation grant has been made to the American Law Institute to
support a study of the rights of the accused following arrest. N.Y. Times, April 22, 1963,
p. 30, col. 1.
32. Eclecticism is apparent in MNfcNabb v. United States, stpra note 29, and in FED. R.
Cman. P. 5(b) ; the influence of the English practice and the Judges' Rules is striking. See
DEVLIN, THE CRMINA. PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND (1958). These advisory rules have no
statutory bases, but are used by the English courts as guidelines for proper police conduct.
For the text of the first four rules, see Rex v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531, 539 .3; the com-
plete Rules are set forth in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 595-97 nn.40-41 (1960).
In the initial stage of the inquiry-"belonging solely to the administrative process"--the
Federal Rule's imitation of the Judges' Rules is complete. See DE%'LIN, op. cit. supra at 31.
Before arrest the English policeman has unfettered interrogative power. But to press the
federal-English analogy beyond this point is to risk inaccuracy. The second stage of the
Judges' Rules begins "when, the suspect becomes the accused." Id. at 33. The caution or
warning is an important element of the English scheme, but it is administered by the police-
man at the time of arrest, not by a separate judicial officer, like the United States Commis-
sioner. The English policeman, therefore, takes on a quasi-judicial capacity and is subject
to judicial restraint. In the United States, the police do not have a similar function. There
is no constitutional requirement obliging the police to notify an accused of the privilege
against self-incrimination prior to interrogation. Comment, Prearraignment Interrogation
and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma; A Proposed Ainendncnt to the Federal Rules of Crim-
iml Procedure, 68 YAIE L.J. 1003, 1036 (1959). See also Turner v. United States, 222
F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Heituer, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945). By the
warning the English policeman declares himself the adversary of the accused. Where, ac-
cording to the common, law rule, a defendant can, demand, as of right, the rejection of an
involuntary confession, he has no such right when. there has been, a breach of the Judges'
Rules.
[T]he judge has a discretion to admit or reject the evidence as he thinks fit; if, for
example, there was only a technical breach of the rules or an excusable one, he would
probably admit the evidence.
DE NI, op. cit. supra at 45. See also Brownlie, Police Questioning, Custody and Caution-
ing, [1960] Canx. L. Rv. (Eng.) 298, 300; Rex v. Voisin, [1918] 1 K.B. 531. Judicially
to rebuke the policeman, for his indiscretion, but to allow the confession or statement, might
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was in support of the constitutional rights of the accused. In Upshaw v. Utnited
States,33 where the Court tied the exclusionary rule to Rule 5 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,34 it became clear that exactly to comply with
Rule 5 would be completely to eliminate the interrogative function immediately
following arrest ;3, McNabb, however, provides the only sanction for noncom-
pliance.
Where McNabb, coupled with Rule 5, is strictly followed, secret police in-
terrogation is deterred, and the accused is protected from stress during a period
in which he is particularly susceptible to coercion. More important, because the
accused appears at the preliminary hearing unsullied and unbroken by coer-
cive interrogation, the United States Commissioner's warning has its fullest
impact, thus augmenting the accused's ability to resist the information-seeking
process during the entire pre-trial period. Admission of initial confessions ren-
dered subsequent to the Commission's warning presents fewer problems for a
court since the accused is then out of the exclusive control of the interrogator.
If the accused is released on bail, the police have no authority to force him to
return to the police headquarters for further interrogation ;30 and, if they want
be a deterrent to future breach of the Judges' Rules. Nevertheless, it is little consolation to
the defendant.
Even after initial warning the English policeman is not free to cross-examine tile ac-
cused. If the accused begins a statement, the policeman, after repeating the caution, can
ask a question to clarify that statement. But the warning, although essential, is not a pal-
liative to interrogation following arrest.
Although the quasi-judicial caution is administered early in the English criminal prose-
cution and American judges look to the Judges' Rules as setting an extraordinarily high
standard, the English practice, like the American, is not alvays effective in the control of
illicit police activity. See Letter from English Policeman on Use of Judges, Rules, SELCTE
WRITINGS ON THE LAv Or EvI NcE AND TRIAL 845-46 (Fryer ed. 1957); G. Williams,
Questioning by the Police: Some Practical Considerations, [1960] CRis. L. REv. (Eng.)
325, 327-28. See also Special Issue On Police Questioning, [1960] Cium. L. REV. (Eng.)
293-380.
33. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
34. See note 16 supra.
35. [A] confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure
promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or not the
"confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological.....
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
See also Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue,
47 GEO. L.J. 1 (1958), and Comment, Prearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-
Mallory Miasma: A Proposed Amendment to the Federal Riles of Criminal Procedure,
68 YALE L.J. 1003 (1959).
But see United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65. 70 (1944) (confession within minutes
after arrest held admissible although accused subsequently held for eight days before
arraignment), and Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel aid
To Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROoKLYN L. Rxv. 24, 40-42 (1960) (classifying eleven ex-
ceptions to McNabb-Mallory and collecting the cases under each).
36. After preliminary hearing, FED. R. CRIM. P. 5, the accused is out of the exclusive
control of the police. See 1958 Hearings, at 33, 40, 42 (statement of Robert V. Murray,
Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department) ; 1943 Hearings, at 6, 7, 10 (statement
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to ask further questions, they must do so at a place of the defendant's ovm
choosing.3 7 If the accused is committed to jail, first the United States Mar-
shal 38 and then the prison warden " is charged with his safekeeping. The
of Robert J. Barrett, Chief of Detectives, District of Columbia). If the charge is a bailable
offense, and the accused can post an appearance bond, Cr. Form No. 17, Appearance Bond
(Rev. 7-59), the accused is released and, thereafter, can be interrogated only by consent.
But cf. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Note, 76 HARv. L REv. 1300
(1963).
If the accused is committed, he is placed in the custody of the United States Marshal.
See Commissioner's Temporary Commitment, Form A. 0. 97 (Rev. 7-1-51), which provides
in pertinent part:
To: The United States Marshal of the District of
You are hereby commanded to take the custody of the above named defendant and
to commit him with a certified copy of this commitment to the custodian of a place
of confinement within the District of approved by the Attor-
ney General of the United States where the defendant shall be received and safely
kept until discharge in due course of law ....
The Magistrate or the United States Commissioner cannot return the accused to the
custody of the police. Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (separate
opinion, dissenting in part, of Bazelon, J.) ; but see Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F2d
335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("[T]he Municipal Judge ordered the appellants to be held for
Grand Jury, and at the request of the police signed an order placing the men in the custody
of the United States Marshal and the police, permitting police interrogation and continued
investigation 'for the purpose of obtaining certain, pieces of evidence,... confronting them
with the complainant and for further purpose of having them re-enact the offense." This
practice was not challenged and the conviction was upheld).
37. Once out on bail, the accused would probably not choose those places which the
police consider most effective for interrogation. Compare Mueller, The Law Relating to
Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations, 52 J. Canx. L., C. & P.S. 2, 3 (1961), with
INBAU & REID at 7 (1962).
38. From the time of preliminary hearing until actual commitment, the Marshal is
charged with the safekeeping of the accused. 18 U.S.C. § 4086 (1958). "Safekeeping" seems
never to have been construed as to require the United States Marshal to fend off the in-
terrogator during the interval. For an indication of the practice in the District of Columbia,
in regard to interrogation during this interval, see Letter from David C. Acheson, United
States Attorney, District of Columbia, to the Yale Law Journal, March 15, 1963, on file in
the Yale Law Library:
Where the commitment order commits directly to jail, there is a period that may
run up to a couple of hours, in which the defendant is in temporary custody in the
cellblock of the Court House, awaiting transportation to the jail. There are no re-
strictions, other than constitutional restrictions, upon, his questioning in the cellblock.
It is possible, therefore, for the interrogator to gain access to the accused during this brief
interval immediately following appearance before the Commissioner.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1958).
If the accused is apprehended in a district where there is no federal penal institution, he
may be confined in a state prison, which is under contract with the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 4003 (1958). At the state institution the United States Mar-
shal has the right and power to fix and govern terms and conditions of confinement. See
Evans v. Madigan, 154 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1957). Presumably, the Marshal could
determine who could have access to the accused for interrogation. Otherise, access to the
accused would be governed by the relevant state statutes. See A. Goldstein, The State and
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policeman then must comply with prison regulations 40 and obtain the defend-
ant's consent to a direct confrontation before he can pursue interrogation. How-
ever ineffective any of these safeguards may be,41 the accused is to some degree
made aware of his right to silence and protected from physical coercion. He is
rendered a better match for the interrogator, and there is less chance for the
use of coercive techniques to which only the accused could testify.
This structure of protection, however, is destroyed where the principle of
Rule 5 is evaded. If the police delay the preliminary hearing and obtain a con-
fession from the accused, despite awareness of the confession's inadmissibility,
the confession, once given, will be hard to repress ;42 the accused's ability to
resist the information seeking process will have been extraordinarily diminished.
The impact of the Commissioner's warning will be much weaker than it would
have been absent a prior confession, for one cannot be expected effectively to
deny, even after repeated warnings, that which he has just admitted.48 Even
in the absence of coercion after the preliminary hearing, a reaffirmation may
be too readily achieved for a court to be at ease with the voluntariness standard
which will then be applied in considering its admissibility. 44
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confess-
ing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the
psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can
never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good.45
The Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YA=. L.J. 1149, 1188 n.130
(1960).
That the police or the federal interrogator has access to the accused for further inter-
rogation is assumed even in those studies which are most protective of the rights of the ac-
cused. See, e.g., HOgsE:Y REPORT 46, 63 (1962).
40. In the District of Columbia, jail regulations require the interrogator to obtain the
consent of the accused prior to questioning. See Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675,
677-78 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (form containing request, purpose, consent, and names of inter-
rogators or visitors).
41. See Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Goldsmith v. United
States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
42. Psychiatric scholarship does not seem to have been directed to this specific problem.
Even in related areas there is little agreement among the scholars. Compare GRoss, CrtM-
IN'AL PSYCHOLOGY (Kallens ed. 1911), with REIK, THE COMPULSioN To CoNrFEss ci. 5, at
254 (1959). See also Redlich, Ravitz & Dession, Narcoanalysis and Truth, 107 Am. J.
PsYCHrATRY 586 (1951) ; Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revc-
lation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953).
43. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
See also Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Naples when presented for preliminary hearing had received the Rule 5 warning.
At the jail, the officer testifies, he had advised Naples that he need not talk to the
officers.... According to the officer, Naples said that "he had already told the rest
of the policemen and he saw no reason why he wouldn't tell me."
Id. at 623.
44. But cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603 (1944).
45. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
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In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the
first. Deprived of the full benefits of the preliminary hearing and subject to the
lingering effects of his prior admissions, the accused is unprepared psycholog-
ically to withstand further interrogation during the interval between prelimin-
ary hearing and trial.
Federal police have not been deterred from detention and interrogation dur-
ing the pre-preliminary hearing period.40 This behavior is encouraged by the
inadequacy of the McNabb exclusionary rule. Although in illegal search and
seizure cases 47 neither evidence unlawfully obtained nor evidence shown to be
the "fruit"48 of such illegal evidence can ever be considered admissible,40 a
similar doctrine has not been applied to the "fruit" of illegal police interroga-
tion.50 The admissibility of evidence discovered as a result of an inadmissible
confession has been virtually unchallenged ;51 the ground for this failure lies,
perhaps, in a feeling that such evidence proves its own probative value, as the
coerced confession may not,5 2 and that it is not as prejudicial to the defendant's
case as the confession itself.0 Exclusionary rules like McNabb, moreover, are
46. In Killough v. United States, 315 F2d 241, 257-58 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1962), Burger,
J., suggested that the "Suppression Doctrine"-by which he means illegal searches and
seizures as well as illegal detention of the accused for purposes of obtaining a confession-
has "totally failed to achieve its stated objective," because it has not been "implemented."
Implementation, for his purposes, would amount to sending a transcript of the motion to
suppress to the D.C. Commissioners for proper disciplinary action. He would not, however,
do anything which "punishes society as a whole for the transgressions of a poorly trained
and badly motivated policeman .. . ." (dissenting opinion).
47. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914); Silverthore Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Com-
pare Mfapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48. The metaphor, a favorite in judicial opinion, seems about to make its solemn prog-
ress from fourth amendment to fifth amendment problems. See Jackson v. United States,
273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (the first Jackson case.) ; and Killough v.
United States, 315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
49. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 693 (1961). For an argument for
limiting the operation of the Mapp rule, see Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence
Illegally Obtained by Private Parties, 72 YA.E L.J. 1062 (1963).
50. An aversion to "Third Degree" police interrogative practices, or to their modern
equivalents, has never been so strong as to penalize the police to this ex'tent. So to hold
would, indeed, amount to saying "the criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
But the reasons for drawing up short in the case of confessions have never been articulated.
One assumes that to hold the confession, and all evidence gathered from it inadmissible
would be too seriously to jeopardize the public interest and public safety. Compare Killough
v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Wright, J., concurring).
51. See Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Wright, J.,
concurring).
52. See Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HIv. L RFv.
1304, 1308-09 (1951).
53. Another reason might be suggested by the way in which the court handled this
secondary evidence in Killough v. United States, supra note 51, at 245. Reversing the con-
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not constitutionally compelled, but applied as a matter of policy in enforcing
constitutional protections. 4 However effective McNabb's extension to con-
nected evidence would be as a deterrent to improper police activity, the vigor-
ous reaction to the presently narrow rule suggests that the effect upon the in-
formation-gathering process of including within its sanctions the inadmissibility
of non-confession evidence, rendering pre-preliminary hearing interrogation
unavailable as a mode of investigation, would make extension intolerable and
inexpedient.55 Not only has the admissibility of this secondary evidence derived
from the inadmissible confession been unchallenged, but subsequent confessions
preserving or reviving the primary admission of guilt are also received in evi-
dence rs although the pragmatic need is not as strong." In United Slates v.
Bayer5 8 the Supreme Court explicitly declined to adopt a strict exclusionary
rule for reaffirmations. If the police can obtain a reaffirmation which itself sat-
isfies the voluntariness rule, 9 it will be admitted. McNabb, therefore, has el-
viction on the theory of the inadmissibility of the reaffirming confession., and remanding the
case to the District Court for new trial, the court did not feel compelled to decide the issue
of the inadmissibility of the secondary evidence. Similar trends, although inarticulate, might
run throughout the cases.
54. 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). Cf. cases cited note 47 slupra.
55. For the extent of opposition to the restrictive character of his rule, see 1958 Hear.
ings at 32-44 (statement of Robert V. Murray, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police De-
partment) ; 1943 Hearings at 1-10 (statement of Edward J. Kelly, Superintendent of Police,
District of Columbia).
56. See Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Goldsmith v. United
States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also McCo.umcx, EVIDENCE § 114 (1954). But
see Jackson v. United States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Killough v. United States,
315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
57. It is often assumed that the police and federal agents have full powers of inter-
rogation following arrest, subject to prison and jail regulations. See notes 39 and 40 spra,
In a related context some courts have classified this as a duty to investigate. United States
v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1962). But the conceptual scheme of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and McNabb-Mallory could be considered to foreclose all police
interrogation following preliminary hearing. The general policy of McNabb is that "the
awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The com-
plicated process of criminal justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility
for which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the criminal law relies
for its vindication." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, other investigatory officers of the federal government and the
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia-all are charged with the
investigation of criminal acts. Questioning everyone who might have relevant information
is indispensable to the adequate performance of this duty. When sufficient information is
gathered to connect a particular individual with the crime, the officer makes an arrest and
the citizen becomes the accused. The accusation effects the transformation. In theory, at
least, nothing more is required of the police officer as interrogator. Interrogation after
arrest has as its purpose the conviction of the defendant-something beyond crime preven-
tion and crime detection. The prosecutor is not without means of obtaining information
either from the accused directly or from the witnesses, as well as the accused, who appear
before the grand jury. Cf. Dession & Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries,
41 YALE L.J. 687 (1932). See also Orfield, The Federal Grand Jutry, 22 F.R.D, 343 (1959).
58. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
59. See MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 114 (1954).
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ways had exposed flanks. So long as evidence or reaffirmations resulting from
inadmissible confessions are admitted, complete deterrence can not be expected
of the rule. But only after the last broad restatenent of McNabb by the Su-
preme Court in Mallory v. United States,60 did specific examples of purposeful




In Jackson v. United States 62 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit first met the problem of circumvention of McNabb-
Mallory through the use of a reaffirming confession. During the eleven hour
period between arrest and preliminary hearing, appellant Jackson orally con-
fessed to a robbery. Immediately after the Commissioner's warning he was
taken back, in the custody of the United States Marshal, to the robbery squad
office where he signed a written confession which had been prepared during
the interval. In a per curiam opinion, the court held the reaffirming confession
inadmissible since it was neither "an independent act based upon proper coun-
sel" nor one "occurring after time for deliberate reflection."es On remand, new
facts were introduced which put the problem of admissibility of reaffirmations
more squarely before the court.04 At preliminary hearing Jackson had had the
advice of counsel; after the hearing he had been taken to the hospital where he
confronted the victim and expressed his regrets about the incident; and he had
received an additional judicial warning at a second hearing. Viewing the com-
plete pattern of events, the D.C. Circuit held the reaffirming confession, taken
by the investigating detectives at the jail, an independent act and therefore ad-
missible. The fact pattern in Goldsmith v. United States,05 decided shortly be-
fore the second Jackson case was similar. Brief consultation with counsel, a
colloquy with the victim and a reenactment of the crime were accepted as in-
dicia of the independence of the reaffirming confession.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court was again confronted with the issue
60. 354 U.S. 449 (1957). Reference to the exclusionary rule often includes Upshaw v.
United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948), but hereinafter the rule will be cited in the shorter
form, as McNabb-Mallory.
61. In Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962), Judge Fahy quoted
from the testimony in Naples v. United States, 307 F2d 618, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1962), where
the police officer admitted that his "only reason for going to the jail to talk to this defend-
ant was to satisfy what might be the additional requirements in the application of the Mal-
lory rule...."
Killough v. United States, supra at 242.
In Killough, the officer's objective was identical:
On cross examination the officer said he had read a case which indicated that a con-
fession obtained before arraignment, although it wras no good, it was all right to talk
about it after arraignment if the defendant made a reference to it or repeated it.
Id. at 243 n.2.
62. 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298 (1960).
63. 273 F.2d at 523.
64. Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; see Note, 49 GEo. L.J.
618 (1961).
65. 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; see Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1961).
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of determining the independent nature of a second confession in Killough v.
United States.0 James W. Killough had reported the disappearance of his wife
and arranged to meet with the District of Columbia police on October 19, 1960,
to assist with an investigation.67 When he failed to keep this appointment the
police proceeded independently. But Killough finally was located on October
24, 1960, taken to police headquarters at 9:30 A.M. and questioned through-
out the day. He was arrested at 9:00 P.M. that evening. On the following day,
between 12:30 and 1:00 P.M., he confessed to killing his wife and led the police
to the city dump where he had hidden her body. After his confession was re-
duced to writing, he was taken to the United States Commissioner for proceed-
ings under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.08 In accordance
with this rule, the Commissioner informed Killough of his constitutional rights,
but the actual probable cause hearing was continued to November 15,00 to allow
him to obtain counsel. Killough was then committed to the District of Columbia
Jail. Within twenty-four hours, and before Killough had obtained counsel, the
arresting officer, under the pretext of returning certain items of clothing and
arranging for the disposition of Mrs. Killough's body,70 gained access to the
accused. During a one-half hour conversation the officer led the accused to the
subject of the earlier confession. Casually and without pressure the police lieu-
tenant obtained an oral reaffirmation of the earlier confession. 71 Here the police
technique was more subtle than that found in some cases; but for the possibility
that McNabb-Mallory was circumvented, the procedures which the police lieu-
tenant followed in seeking information were unassailable. The police lieutenant
complied with the regulations of the District of Columbia Jail " in obtaining
defendant's consent prior to confrontation. He respected the restrictions of the
commitment order,73 and did not attempt to remove the accused to police head-
quarters. Nevertheless, the integrity of McNabb-Mallory was challenged by
finding a way around it. For the court in Killough not to meet this challenge
would have been to leave the police a much too attractive loophole. Of what
66. 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962), reversing 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.C. 1961).
67. Id. at 255-57 (dissenting opinion). The statement of facts is taken from Judge
Burger's dissenting opinion.
68. FFD. R. Cm. P. 5, supra note 16.
69. K.illough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
70. Id. at 256 (dissenting opinion). On appeal, one issue before the court was the ad-
missibility of the coroner's testimony in regard to the discovery of the victim's body. Al-
though Judge Wright, in, his concurring opinion, would have excluded such testimony under
the rule of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) and Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Killough court, in deciding the cases on the basis
of the inadmissibility of the reaffirming confession alone, passed the issue, Irillough v.
United States, supra note 69, at 245-52.
71. Id. at 256 (dissenting opinion by Burger, J.).
[The interrogating officer] testified that Killough was "overly talkative," needed no
prompting and would have continued the conversation longer if... [the officer] had
been willing to stay. Killough also requested... [the officer] to return later to visit.
72. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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consequence would it be to strike down a post-arrest confession if its total evi-
dentiary value could be so easily resuscitated? As a deterrent to police lawless-
ness, McNabb-Mallory would be useless; the interrogator, in effect, would have
the benefit of both the secondary evidence derived from the confession and the
primary admission of guilt.
The Killough court, sitting en banc, was split five-four, with four dissents
filed; the "majority opinion" holding the confession inadmissible commanded
only four signatures, with Judge Wright concurring on broader grounds than
his brethren cared to reach. Judge Fahy, writing for the "majority" was un-
willing to meet the issues squarely. But the language of his opinion indicates
an awareness that the Killough confessions raised two important problems:
the accused's diminished ability to resist interrogation, 74 and the concerted at-
tempt of the police to circumvent McNabb-Mallory." It was this latter con-
sideration-a desire to protect the integrity of McNabb-Mallory-which
seemed to be the dominant concern of his court. As Judge Fahy wrote:
To admit [the reaffirming confession] would in substance and effect admit
the earlier confessions properly held inadmissible, and thus defeat the ex-
clusionary rule. To hold otherwise would be in reality to permit an accused
to be tried without counsel, jury or court, alone with police at their head-
quarters or at jail.76
By its apparent reference to problems affecting the admissibility of all confes-
sions obtained by interrogation, the passage may indicate a concern for the
striking differentiation between due process standards and trial-type safeguards
at trial and before trial.77 But the text is in fact directed to the narrow issue of
74. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (referring to the
irony of the magistrate's warning).
75. In his opinion Judge Fahy quoted from the record in, Naples v. United States, 307
F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1962), which "frankly revealed that [the later confession] was obtained
for the purpose of circumventing the Mallory rule. . . ." Killough v. United States, 315
F.2d 241, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1962). To quote from the record of another case to support an
assertion of "circumvention' in Killough did not go unnoticed by the dissent. Id. at 255
(Burger, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 244.
77. The approach taken in this note is to consider the problem of a reaffirming confes-
sion within the normal chronology of events-from illegal detention and confession, to the
breakdown of the McNabb-Mallory scheme for protecting the accused and the consequent
ineffectiveness of the magistrate's warning, to the establishment of standards for determin-
ing the admissibility of the reaffirming confession. But rather than view the problem from
arrest forward, one could consider the admissibility of the second confession by reasoning
from trial backward through the pre-trial proceedings.
Commentators seem to agree that something happens to the accused at the time of arrest.
See DEvLvi, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUrION IN ENGLAND 33 passins (1958); Killough v.
United States, 315 F.2d 241, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Fahy, J.). Metaphorically, arrest is a
"declaration of war." DEvLIN, op. cit. supra. Or, as Judge Fahy indicates, arrest may signal
a "change in the status and relationship of the parties... ." Killough v. United States, mipra
at 247. But once "probable cause" has been, proved or an indictment has been issued, it is
evident that the government, as adversary, will pursue conviction; courts act as the arbiter
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circumvention in the McNabb context; even then, however, there seem to be
certain weaknesses in Judge Fahy's reasoning. If the police obtain a second
confession through non-coercive interrogation occurring after the preliminary
hearing, that confession could only be deemed improper if it is linked with the
initial illegally obtained confession. And if the courts can develop meaningful
standards for determining when the undesired link is present, those standards
will aid them to decide the admissibility issue without need to refer to the
emotionally weighted matter of circumvention. That the police, in obtaining a
reaffirmation, acted properly, could not be characterized as circumvention. If
the court, through the use of proper standards, found a link, the confession
would be suppressed. It is only when meaningful standards have not been for-
mulated, when there is no clear way to distinguish linked reaffirmation from
unconnected confessions, that the court must face the apparent question of cir-
cumvention, as police seek to probe the boundaries of their freedom. To avoid
that morass, the court must proceed, independently of McNabb-Mallory, to
of the conflict and the defendant, in theory at least, is especially protected by the constitu-
tional concepts of "due process" and the privilege against self-incrimination.
But, although conviction is no less a police goal in pre-trial interrogation, the constitu-
tional protections--"counsel, jury and court"--and procedural safeguards of trial are not
available then. Our concept of due process allows a variety of standards; "fairness" before
trial is something less than "fairness" at trial. This differential has troubled others than
Judge Fahy.
Depriving a person, formally charged with crime, of counsel during the period
prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself.
We do not have here mere suspects who are being secretly interrogated by tile
police ... nor witnesses who are being questioned in secret administrative or judicial
proceedings.... This is a case of an accused, who is scheduled to be tried by a judge
and jury, being tried in a preliminary way by the police. This is a kangaroo court
procedure whereby the police produce the vital evidence in the form of a confession
which is useful or necessary to obtain a conviction. They in effect deny him effective
representation, by counsel.
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959) (Douglas, J., with whom Black and Bren-
nan, J.J., join, concurring). See also id. at 327 (Stewart, J., with whom Douglas and Bren-
nan, J.J., join, concurring).
Since counsel is the most mobile of trial safeguards, most attention has been focused
upon this problem. See, e.g., People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.
2d 21 (1960) ; Post-Indictment Questioning It Absence of Counsel Violates Due Process
Requirements, 61 CoLUm. L. REv. 744 (1961); People v. Waterman. 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175
N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961) ; People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962). By implication, the object seems to be to narrow the gap by judl-
cializing all pre-trial proceedings, see, e.g., Note, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence fron:
Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 590 (1963), or, as in the New York cases,
supra, by making the presence of counsel at pre-trial interrogation indispensable to the
admissibility of information gathered directly from the accused. Owing to physical and
temporal limitations it is unlikely that the sanctuary of the court room can protect the ac-
cused from arrest through trial. But the concept of due process is sufficiently dynamic and
flexible to allow a more thorough consideration of all post arrest police interrogation. Com-
pare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675
(D.C. Cir. 1960), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and People v. Meyer, sunpra.
See Perlman, Dte Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1304 (1951).
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attempt the establishment of standards for determining the admissibility of
confessions.
The majority in Killough not only declined to establish standards, it also
implied its disapproval of those standards which seemed to be available through
the decisions in Goldsmith and Jackson. Since Killough had had neither con-
sultation with counsel nor the benefit of a lapse of time between the two con-
fessions, Goldmith and Jackson were distinguishable." But the court indicated
that had Killough been squarely within the two earlier cases, it would have
been willing to reconsider them.79 On the other hand, the court was willing to
assume that the accused was at a psychological disadvantage after confessing
before the preliminary hearing and that the Commissioner's warning had failed
to overcome that disadvantage, i.e., that there.was a connection between the
first and second confession.80 Thus, the court vacillated between an assumption
that a valid second confession could be obtained after preliminary hearing and
a conviction that awful things would happen if that confession were admissible.
Although some of the language of the opinion is reminiscent of the search and
seizure cases "' with their "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine,$ the poison
in the fruit of Killough's first confession will, at some indeterminate time and
under certain indeterminate circumstances, lose its toxicity.
78. Counsel had not been appointed at the time of Killough's reaffirming confession.
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The majority in Goldsmith
v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960) relied upon. a colloquy between the defend-
ants and one of the persons robbed and another person in holding the reaffirming confession
admissible. Id. at 341. Judge Fahy seized upon this as "another circumstance" distinguish-
ing the case. Killough v. United States, mupra at 244. Admittedly, this was a distinguishing
factor, but Judge Fahy did not address himself to the insuperable difficulty which colloquy
with the deceased victim would have presented in this case. Colloquy with a third party,
at least, would be within the realm of the possible.
79. "Accordingly, neither Goldmith nor Jackson requires admission of the jail confes-
sion in this case. Were the situation otherwise, a majority of the court, which now for the
first time considers the problem en banc, would be ready to reconsider those cases." Kil-
lough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
The implied disapproval of the Goldmith and Jackson standards-that the absence of
counsel's advice and colloquy was sufficient to distinguish the cases, but that had those
elements been present in Killough they would not necessarily have been sufficient to require
the admission of the confession-is curious when read in conjunction with a later statement
by the court.
[N]owhere have we said that a post-hearing confession, following one illegally pro-
cured before the hearing, must necessarily await the entry of counsel; nor do we
predetermine that the passage of no amount of time could remove the taint of a con-
fession obtained in defiance of the exclusionary rule.
Killough v. United States, supra at 246.
80. Killough v. United States, supra note 79, at 244.
81. See note 47 mpra and accompanying text.
82. "The oral confession ... must be held inadmissible as the fruit of the latter."
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Cf. Jackson v. United
States, 273 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (the first Jackson case), cited as authority by the
court. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" metaphor was not used in Jackson.
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Judge Wright, in his concurrence, was fully willing to overrule Jackson and
Goldsmith 83 and employ in their stead a rebuttable presumption to supply
greater protection against dependent reaffirming confessions. 8 4 But he, like the
majority, was unable to arrive at objective standards by which the second con-
fession's independence could be established.8 5 The task he set would be unduly
arduous: to rebut a presumption of continued coercion the court must consider
the totality of conduct surrounding the second confession, examine the accused
to estimate the rehabilitative effect of isolation from his adversaries 80 and, on
occasion, even invade the attorney-client privilege to determine the content of
their consultations.8 7 In this crucial respect he took the same approach as the
majority opinion. The integrity of McNabb-Mallory would be preserved by
developing a subjective standard, unfortunately similar to that which the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule was created to avoid in similarly difficult fact situations.88
Arguably, after the preliminary hearing with its clear warning, 9 a subjective
standard would be less difficult to administer where the question presented was
the admissibility of a confession rendered without the background of any pre-
preliminary hearing interrogation. But where there has been productive police
interrogation in advance of the preliminary hearing, McNabb vitiates the neces-
sity for inquiry into the presence of coercion, since coercion is presumed. 0
Since there is no determination of coercion in the first instance, the use of a
83. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
84. Id. at 249. As to the first confession, obtained during illegal detention, Judge Wright
establishes a conclusive presumption of involuntariness. Id. at 249-50. Cf. Note, 70 YAMn
L.J. 298, 305-06 (1960). Consequently, in every instance the Government, under Judge
Wright's theory, would have to rebut the presumption of the continuing influence of pre-
sumed, not actual or determinable, coercion. The theory seems to assume that the very fact
of confession and subsequent "psychological helplessness" is more devastating than actual
coercive interrogative techniques. Killough v. United States, supra at 250. See also United
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947). Similarly, Judge Wright did not think that
"the bare admonition required by Rule 5(b) is likely to convert spiritless despair to alert
vigilance in a suspect whose secret is already out." Killough v. United States, supra at 250.
85. See Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid. Although he recognized the "intervention of counsel" as a "most important
safeguard," Judge Wright demonstrated little confidence in "fleeting representation." Ills
criticism was directed to Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
While counsel had been appointed just prior to the arraignments-apparently an
attorney who happened to be in the courtroom-and while he conferred briefly with
appellants, he quickly vanished from the scene. The attorney does not appear to have
been even aware of the written, confessions or their inadmissible character and lie
did not accompany the appellants when they were taken away.
Id. at 346 (Fahy, J., dissenting).
In Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the accused's attorney gave
an express warning to his client immediately after preliminary hearing. Id. at 677 n.7. Con-
sidering the experience of the attorney and the accused's disregard of that advice, Judge
Wright seems justified in his doubt as to the lasting effect of fleeting advice.
88. See notes 15-27 supra and accompanying text.
89. FED. R. Cam. P. 5(b).
90. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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subjective standard is made virtually impossible-there is no basis for com-
parison to determine whether the hurtful effects of coercion, which has only
possibly occurred, have been cured by subsequent events. And even if there
were a means of comparison, the infinite variety of circumstances which would
have to be considered in a subjective "totality" test seems to render such a
standard extremely unworkable. The lingering effect of the "Third Degree"
will depend on the comparative resiliency of different defendants. Mere confine-
ment for a number of hours may be sufficient to compel one particular defend-
ant to confess even without questioning; another might be able to withstand
even the most brutal treatment before self-incrimination.01 In these situations
either one or both might or might not be rendered perfectly capable of resist-
ing interrogation following the Commissioner's warning at preliminary hear-
ing. The combinations of psychologically unique individuals and subtle police
interrogative methods are infinite.92 How thorough would the finding of fact
have to be for the court to decide that, for a particular defendant, the ability to
resist interrogation was satisfactory and the admissibility of a reaffirmation
possible?
Even in Killough, the court can not fairly be said to have followed out its
own suggestion of case-by-case analysis employing a subjective standard since
it held the reaffirming confession inadmissible without detailed discussion of
the facts of the case.93 But it seems that it should have faced the difficulties
which such a rule would pose to both courts and police. In addition to creating
unrealistic requirements of judicial inquiry, the use of a subjective "totality"
standard takes an arguably unrealistic view of judicial decision. However much
courts might protest that cases must be decided in the factual context of the
instant controversy, they are inevitably guided by benchmarks established in
previous cases. The six month period between illegal confession and reaffirma-
tion in United States v. Bayer,94 for example, might well be used as a guide-
line. And that the defendants in Goldsmith and Jackson had fleeting consulta-
tion with counsel was at least sufficient to allow the court to avoid overruling
the cases in Killough, and might provide standards for future cases. Further-
more, the problems which inhere in a subjective rule are not confined to the
court; such a rule is filled with temptations and difficulties for the police and
prosecutor. While the McNabb-Mallory rule, itself, might be considered a harsh
and unreasonable obstacle to efficient police administration,0 5 it is straightfor-
91. For comments upon the impact of extended interrogation and individual reaction,
see generally Hearings On Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of
American Military and Civilian Prisoners Before the Permanent Subcommnittee on Investi-
gations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
92. Compare ENGLISH & FRrcu, INTRODUcTiox TO PsYcHrATRY 232-91 (2d ed. 1957),
with IrBAu & R~m 21-116.
93. The oral confession obtained in this case at the jail so soon after the illegally pro-
cured and inadmissible confessions must be held inadmissible as the fruit of the latter.
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
94. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
95. See note 31 supra.
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ward and relatively dear. If the arresting officer detains the accused for ques-
tioning before preliminary hearing he can be sure that any resulting confession,
the most attractive product which he can obtain from his interrogation, is sub-
ject to challenge. 6 And, although this rule is not wholly self-applying, it is
sufficiently clear to allow nonjudicial application and to deter to some degree
the willful detention of the accused following arrest. Nevertheless, such clarity
of command is completely lacking in the Killough opinions. Subjective, unde-
fined rules are more conducive to further experimentation in circumvention
than to deterrence of illegal activity-a result exactly opposite from that which
the court intended and one which weakens McNabb-Mallory as well as the
reaffirmation rule. If a twenty-four hour interval between confessions is too
short, thirty-six hours and a brief conversation with counsel might be adequate
to secure an admissible reaffirmation. So goes the police interrogator's parlor
game which the court fails to discourage.
In view of these difficulties, which are implicit in the subjective rule of Kit-
lough, a single, objective standard for determining the admissibility of a re-
affirming confession may offer the best solution to the problems of police cir-
cumvention of McNabb-Mallory and the debilitating effect of confessions dur-
ing a period of illegal detention.9 7 Such a single-standard rule, limited in effect
to reaffirmation situations,98 would be independent of Rule 5 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9 The single standard-a signal, objectively as-
certainable event, easily identifiable-should indicate the complete severance of
the initial and subsequent confessions and an ability to cope with interrogative
techniques substantially equal to that which the accused would have possessed
had he not confessed prior to preliminary hearing. Three possible events or
circumstances might provide such a single-standard rule: a minimum time in-
terval between confessions; a specific warning by magistrate or counsel directed
to the admissibility of previous confessions; and the presence of magistrate or
counsel at any post-hearing interrogation.
96. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). But see Rothblatt & Rothblatt,
Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BitooKLYN L.
REv. 24, 40-42 (1960), for the classification of exceptions to Mallory; see, e.g., United
States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944) ; Sutton v. United States, 267 F.2d 271 (4th Cir.
1959) ; Heideman v. United States, 259 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Porter v. United States,
258 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Metoyer v. United States, 250 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ;
United States v. Levitort, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1951). Cf. United States v. Carignan, 342
U.S. 36 (1951).
97. To overrule United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947) and to establish a strict
exclusionary rule for all confessions reaffirming McNabb-Mallory inadmissible confessions
would be the most direct solution. On the assumption that there may, occasionally, be a
genuinely independent reaffirming confession, however, such a rule would be extraordinarily
harsh. To discipline the police while protecting the accused can, it seems, be accomplished
through other means.
One authority would avoid the problems of establishing a viable standard by holding
inadmissible in evidence any confession repudiated by the accused in court, Rogge, Book
Review, 76 H~Av. L. Rxv. 1521 (1963).
98. See note 113 infra.
99. See note 16 supra.
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Although courts might find the first two circumstances more closely allied
with the case law, these events do not necessarily assure the restoration of the
accused's former ability to resist. A reasonably short, specific time interval
between the two confessions-one week, a month or six months-would afford
objectivity, but it might well fail, in the ordinary case, 00 to offer sufficient as-
surance of rehabilitation. Moreover, weeks or months of "recuperation" might,
in a moment, be completely destroyed either by innuendo or by an overt re-
minder of guilt and prior confession. The fact of prior conversation with coun-
sel, emphasized in both Goldsmith and Jackson, or with a magistrate informed
of the confession, discussed by Judge Wright in Killough,1'0 represents another
possibility. But fleeting conversation with counsel, however emphatic he might
be in his instructions to his client, is no guarantee that the accused is prepared
to withstand further interrogation or make a decision to plead guilty only with
a view to his best interests. 02 The same objection seems to lessen the advis-
ability of a proposed standard dependent upon warning from the magistrate.
Although an official warning might seem to have more impact, there are ad-
ditional impediments to judging admissibility on the basis of a magistrate's
warning. The lingering effect of the first confession may not be removed by the
magistrate's warnings, even if they are extraordinary; the magistrate vill be
unable to inform the accused conclusively as to the admissibility of his first
confession.' 03 To receive the magistrate's warning, moreover, the accused would
have to admit the fact of prior confession to a judicial officer, an admission
which would necessarily have a severe psychological impact, probably weaken-
ing rather than strengthening his future resistance. Finally, as is the case for
both of these suggested events, the magistrate's warning not only fails to justify
a decision that the "link" has been destroyed, but also renders no assistance in
evaluating the impact of interrogative techniques in obtaining the second con-
fession.
100. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
101. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
102. See Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675, 677 m7 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
103. It has been suggested that accused's ignorance of the inadmissibility of a confes-
sion made during illegal detention is the source of the weakness in the commissioner's warn-
ing. In the terms of United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947), the warning does
nothing to put the "cat back in the bag." As a remedy to this situation, it has been sug-
gested that the accused should be told-either by the interrogator himself or by the com-
missioner-that the first confession, is inadmissible. Note, 26 TrxAs L. REv. 536, 538 (1948) ;
McComa xc, EvmENcE § 114, at 237 (1954). But the determination, of what interrogation
is legal and what is illegal is almost impossible at this stage. See supra note 97. And, as
Judge Wright stated in Kiliough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1962), "the
magistrate is in no position to give such unequivocal assurance" that the earlier confession
is inadmissible.
But the procedure envisioned here falls short of a determination of the admissibility of
the confession. Rather, the magistrate would ask the accused if he had confessed before
preliminary hearing. If the answer were in, the affirmative, the magistrate would then pro-
ceed with an extraordinary warning-that it might be possible that the pre-preliminary
hearing confession would be inadmissible and that the accused should, in subsequent inter-
rogation, be exceedingly cautious in his statements to the police.
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The third suggestion, that counsel or magistrate be present at any post-hear-
ing interrogation, seems a more radical, but more hopeful suggestion. It would
insure, as a condition of holding a confession admissible, that there is an ex-
ternalized reminder of the need for caution with the accused at the time of
assault upon his resistance. Presence, rather than mere advice, becomes the
objective prerequisite to admissibility. Indeed, what the accused, already sub-
jected to interrogation, needs is an agent or a buffer between himself and in-
terogator rather than a mere remembrance of previous warning. A requirement
that a magistrate be present could validly be opposed as disruptive of judicial
schedules, a duplication of the effort of arraignment, and an approximation of
inquisitorial jurisprudence unseemly for our legal system.1°4 These objections
and similar objections cannot, however, be raised to the presence of a lawyer.
Only inhibition of police interrogation seems a relevant complaint ;105 but that
is exactly what is intended.1 0 By experience and perspective, informed con-
104. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
105. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
106. The inhibition of the interrogative activities of the Metropolitan Police of the
District of Columbia and federal investigative officers, generally, is the primary objective.
For a study of the District of Columbia police practices in a related area, see Holssy
REPORT (1962). For more general comments, with specific reference to police practices in
the State of California, see Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release
or Charge, 50 CAmLF. L. REv. 11 (1962).
In federal criminal matters, United States Attorneys seem rarely to interrogate the
accused. In response to a questionnaire regarding their practices, one United States Attor-
ney said that he and his assistants "seldom, if ever, question the accused following pre-
liminary hearing." One said, "We.. . avoid it as a bad practice." Another replied,
We never interview subjects under arrest at any time, except where a co-defendant
has plead [sic] guilty and will testify in behalf of the government at the trial of the
other defendant.
Another replied,
As a general practice neither I nor any of my assistants question an accused follow-
ing or prior to a preliminary hearing.
The bulk of the replies, however, indicated a practice of deferring to the federal investiga-
tive agencies in all matters of interrogation.
If counsel has been either retained or appointed, the replies indicate an attempt on the
part of the United States Attorney to direct the federal investigatory agent to interrogate
the accused either in the presence of counsel or, at least, with his consent. Some of the
replies on this point were as follows:
If counsel has been retained or appointed, questioning of the accused is always con-
ducted in the presence of such counsel. [No distinction was made between the federal
investigator and the United States Attorney.]
Federal agents do interview the accused after arrest. If counsel is retained or ap-
pointed, the agents are directed to contact the attorney before an interview is under-
taken.
In cases where counsel has been retained we have no contact whatsoever with the
accused and any interrogation, or other matters are conducted by the investigating
agencies with the consent of or in the presence of counsel for the defense.
If the accused is represented by counsel, this office arranges for the accused to confer
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sel -07 could be expected to restrain the police in the use of coercive, deceptive
or subtle interrogative techniques; he would be able to assess the merits of the
case to determine, with a view to the facts arising from his previous conversa-
tion with the accused, what facts should be denied and what should be ad-
mitted.10 8 With counsel present, therefore, courts could be assured that if the
accused were to reaffim his first confession, or, in any way, respond to ques-
tions, he would do so after a balance had been created between the power
of the interrogator to induce the reaffirming confession and the accused's ability
to resist self-incrimination. Just as the Commissioner's warning is compelled
by McNabb-Mallory to prepare the unsullied and unbroken defendant for fur-
ther questioning; so the presence of counsel is needed to prepare the victim of
actual or presumptive police coercion for further interrogation.
Reaffirmation is possible under such a rule-even though it is less likely to
occur. To require the presence of counsel as a prerequisite to valid reaffirna-
tion might possibly bar "any admissions except where the accused is advised
and prepared to enter a guilty plea."' 0 9 Arguably, however, there is a distinct
similarity between a confession given at this stage of the criminal process, and
a guilty plea." 0 A defendant is not required to plead to a felony unless he has
the assistance of counsel;"' it is no less appropriate, in a comparable situa-
tion, to afford a similar advantage to one whose rights have been abused by
illicit police activity. Presumably, the police have proved "probable cause" and
have all of the information which they gained from the first confession; if so,
with such counsel prior to questioning by Government agents; if for any reason such
conference cannot be accomplished, permission of defense counsel is secured prior to
questioning by Government agents.
Letters from United States Attorneys to the Yale Law Journal, April-May, 1963, on file
in the Yale Law Library.
107. Since it is the police who know what information was obtained during a period of
illegal detention, they could be given, the burden of seeking the reaffirming confession in
the presence of counsel. But counsel, at this early stage, would need information as to what
statements were made as well as other information important to the defense. Even with
such a limited application, the proposed rule for admissible reaffirming confessions might
strengthen the argument for extended discovery in criminal cases. See A. Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Crinizal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149,
1172-98 (1960) ; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CUw. L.
Rxv. 56 (1961) ; Lonisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal
Law, 14 VAND. L. REv. 921 (1961); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 H.Av. L
R-v. 940, 1051-63 (1961).
108. See SPEcIAL. CoMMs. OF THE Ass'xw OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw Yo.a,
EQUAL JUscE FOR THE AccusE 35 (1959).
109. Kilough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion).
110. See 3 WiGisoRE, EvIDENcE §§ 816, 821 (3d ed. 1940).
111. See Comment, 68 YA.u L.J. 1003, 1004 n.2 (1959). On, right to counsel, see gen-
erally Bw y, TuE RIGHT To COUNSEL Ix AmFmcAN CouRrs (1955); Douglas, The
Right to Counsel--A Foreword, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1961); Beaney, Right to Counsel
Before Arraignment, 45 Mirx. L. REv. 771 (1961); Hearings Before the Subcommittee
No. 2 on Representation for Indigent Defendants in the Federal Courts of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 13 (1959).
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the need to interrogate is no longer so pressing,112 and it is then even more
reasonable to reduce the likelihood of an attempt to profit from a former in-
discretion. A similar approach has in fact been adopted by the New York courts
in recent years in dealing with the right to presence of counsel generally.,, In
direct response to Supreme Court dicta in Spano v. New York,114 in which
the Court held inadmissible a confession resulting from a prolonged and
112. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74
(1961).
113. In these cases the New York courts refused to limit their consideration to a
specific class of cases; their opinions bear directly upon the indispensability of counsel in
post arrest or post indictment interrogation or in any situation where the prosecution seeks
information from the accused. In People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200
N.Y.S2d 21 (1960) ; Note, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 744 (1961), the New York Court of Appeals
held that, where a defendant was questioned after indictment and surrender for arraignment
in the absence of his attorney, incriminating statements made during that period were ill-
admissible in evidence.
In People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961), tile
argument of Di Biasi was pursued one step further:
The constitutional and statutory right of a defendant to the assistance of counsel at
every stage of a criminal cause ... is limited neither to capital cases ... nor to the
situation where the defendant already has an attorney. The constitutional guarantee
"includes a reasonable time to obtain counsel." [sic).
People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S,2d 70, 74 (1961),
As to the need to interrogate, Judge Fuld reasoned:
Since the finding of the indictment presumably imports that the People have legally
sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged . . , the necessities
of appropriate police investigation, "to solve a crime, or even to absolve a suspect"
cannot be urged as justification for any subsequent questioning of the defendant,
Ibid.; see note 57 supra.
The overriding concept in both cases is the principle of right to counsel and one's free-
dom from "testimonial compulsion" The same concept was again applied in the third case
in the series, People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962),
but the rights in question were pushed back from the indictment stage to the time of arrest
and arraignment, N.Y. CODE C~im. P. § 165, or, in terms of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to preliminary hearing. FED. R. CRim. P. 5 (a). In Meyer voluntary, unsolicited
statements made by an accused to a police officer after arraignment and before indictment
were held inadmissible. The defendant had not requested counsel, nor had counsel been
appointed at the time the challenged statement was made. Judge Dye, writing the court's
opinion, stated:
An arraignment after an arrest must be deemed the first stage of a criminal pro-
ceeding.., especially when, as here, the accused has been held for the Grand Jury,
with fixation of bail .... In reason and logic the admissibility into evidence of a post-
arraignment statement should not be treated any differently than a post indictment
statement. A statement so taken necessarily impinges on the fundamentals of protec-
tion against testimonial compulsion, since the jury might well accord it weight be-
yond its worth to reach a verdict of guilty. While an accused may waive a funda-
mental right, he did not do so here, nor is he estopped because he had made no re-
quest when informed of his rights.
People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y2d 162, 164, 182 N.E2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962).
114. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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arduous interrogation, the New York courts have attacked the problem of post-
arrest interrogation in terms of the right to presence of counsel during the trial
and investigation process. And this right has been extended, to its fullest ex-
tent, backwards from the trial through indictment to arraignment-the first
pleading of the people.
Despite these seeming advantages of presence of counsel, and the experience
of the New York courts, it might be argued that the presence of counsel dur-
ing pre-trial interrogation--even in the limited number of cases in which illicit
confessions are obtained-will be too great a clog in the prosecutorial machinery.
But it is not necessary for counsel to play a role as active as he plays at trial.
He would have the right to advise, but not direct, silence of him from whom
the police may seek, but not compel, speech. Counsel need not have a formal
role: his presence alone will restrain police coercion and encourage voluntary
resistance. If, in fact, the accused is overcome by a "terrible sense of guilt""15
and, voluntarily, wants to unburden himself by confessing to the crime, he is
not estopped by this rule, and could not be silenced by counsel. If the defend-
ant is loquacious, flaunting his crime before a cellmate or confiding in a third
party-either of whom could testify to the confession-he falls outside the rule.
It is not this relationship which is to be controlled; the balance to be estab-
lished is that between the accused and the police. If, of course, the third party
were the agent of the interrogator or the prosecutor, the sanction of the rule
would apply.116 Skillfully planting and, possibly, instructing, a non-police in-
terrogator with the accused can be at least as effective as a direct confrontation
of the accused and his adversary.11 7 Nor need the rule make impossible the in-
terrogation of defendants who refuse to retain, or to request the appointment
of, counsel. If they come to this decision, after a reasonable time for considera-
tion of this problem and after having been informed of their rights, their de-
liberate action could be considered a waiver of the rule.
Compared with the voluntariness rule or that of the Killough court, to in-
sist upon the presence of counsel as a prerequisite to the admissibility of a post-
preliminary hearing reaffirmation of an illegal confession might pose even more
difficult problems for the court were it not for the trend towards the earlier
appointment of counsel in indigent cases." 8 Otherwise, the impecunious accused
essentially would be immune from reaffirmation, for inability to retain counsel
cannot be equated with waiver of the right to counsel." 0 In federal criminal pro-
cedure, the right to counsel has not been held specifically to attach at the time of
preliminary hearing.'12 0 The indigent criminal defendant cannot demand coun-
115. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger, J, dis-
senting).
116.- But see United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962), criticized in 76
H. v. L. REv. 1300 (1963).
117. United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962).
118. Cf. Gideon v. Wainvright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
119. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
120. Burall v. Johnston, 53 F. Supp. 126, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 230
(9th Cir. 1944). But compare, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), with Cicenia v.
Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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sel until he is required to plead to the charge.121 But the policy of earlier rep-
resentation is being pursued in other ways. In the Preliminary Draft of Pro-
posed Amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 122 the District of Columbia Legal Aid Act of 1960,123 and a
similar bill now pending in both the House 12 and the Senate,'12 an evolving
federal policy of early representation is taking clear shape. Counsel is to be
appointed in all federal cases "within a reasonable time after ... request ;120 in
the District of Columbia, he is to be available for all criminal proceedings poten-
tially involving penitentiary sentences, including appearances before the United
States Commissioner.1 27 If counsel is available for general advice and consulta-
tion at preliminary hearing and throughout the pre-trial and trial stages of the
criminal process, it does not seem unreasonable to insist upon his presence dur-
ing what may be the most critical of all times, the time of the reaffirmation of
a confession produced, in the first instance, by improper interrogation."-"
121. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; FED. R. CRIM. P. 44.
122. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERECE
OF THE UNITED STATES, RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTIftc
COURTS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS Rule 44, at 25 (1962).
123. District of Columbia Legal Aid Act, 74 Stat. 229 (1960), D.C. Code § 2-2202
(1962).
124. H.R. 4816, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See N.Y. Times, June 6, 1963, p. 31,
col. 6.
125. S. 1057, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
126. See Proposed Rule 44, supra note 120.
127. District of Columbia Legal Aid Act, 74 Stat. 229 (1960), D.C. Code § 2-2202
(1962).
128. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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